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CAN WE PROTECT THE INNOCENT WITHOUT FREEING THE GUILTY? 
THOUGHTS ON INNOCENCE REFORMS THAT AVOID HARMFUL TRADEOFFS 
By Paul G. Cassell1 
Introduction 
The other thoughtful Chapters in this book call for action to prevent factually innocent 
defendants from being convicted at trial.  These Chapters quite rightly draw attention to the 
fundamental importance of the criminal justice system accurately separating the guilty from the 
innocent.  But the Chapters’ policy prescriptions, at least in some cases, rest on shakier ground.  
In my contribution to the discussion, I address two points.  First, protecting against 
wrongful convictions can create tradeoffs.  If poorly crafted, a reform measure might not only 
prevent convicting innocent persons but also guilty persons, allowing dangerous criminals to 
avoid incarceration and continue to victimize innocent persons.  From a public policy 
perspective, these tradeoffs create concern that reform measures may be cures worse than the 
disease.  
With this caution in mind, I offer a second point: that it is possible to craft reforms that 
help to protect the innocent without allowing the escape of the guilty.  A common theme 
underlying many of these proposals is that they reorient the criminal justice system away from 
adjudicating procedural issues and toward considering substantive issues – i.e., issues of guilt or 
innocence. The truly innocent will benefit in a system that values substance over procedure.  We 
ought to give serious consideration to measures that move the system in that direction.    
I. Comparing and Quantifying the Risk of Wrongful Conviction to the Risk of 
Victimization 
Two Kinds of Tragedies 
In considering the issue of wrongful convictions, some broader perspective is useful.  To 
be sure, the conviction of even a single factually-innocent person is a tragedy. A grave and 
serious injustice has been done whenever the criminal justice system wrongfully convicts and 
1 Ronald N. Boyce Presidential Professor of Criminal Law, S.J. Quinney College of Law at the University of Utah. I 
appreciate the helpful comments of participants in the Symposium on Wrongful Convictions and the DNA 
Revolution: Twenty-Five Years of Freeing the Innocent at Northeastern University School of Law and Ron Allen, 
Patricia Cassell, Sam Gross, Josh Marquis, Daniel Medwed, and Erin Riley.  This research was made possible in 
part through generous support from the Albert and Elaine Borchard Fund for Faculty Excellence.   
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imprisons someone for a crime he has not committed.2  But, sadly, this is not the only kind of 
tragedy that the criminal justice system must be concerned about.3  A properly-functioning 
criminal justice system has to consider not only the suffering of those who have been wrongfully 
convicted, but also those who have become (or will become) the victims of crimes.  
Violent crime victims and their families also suffer almost unimaginable emotional and 
physical pain—suffering that is often aggravated when the victim learns that the crime could 
have been prevented through a more effective criminal justice system. I will resist the temptation 
to appeal to the reader’s emotions by recounting the specific details of what happened to them. 
The interested reader can easily find such unhappy details elsewhere.4  And these kinds of 
tragedies occur frequently.  As Josh Marquis has observed, “[t]he justice system is far from 
perfect and has made many mistakes, mostly in favor of the accused.  Hundreds, if not 
thousands, have died or lost their livelihood through embezzlement or rape because the 
American justice system failed to incarcerate people who were guilty by any definition.”5    
How to assess these competing risks is exceedingly complex.  Fortunately other 
thoughtful observers have already done important spadework on this issue.  An extremely helpful 
discussion of the convicting-the-guilty-while-sparing-the-innocent tradeoff is found in Professor 
Ronald J. Allen and Investigator Larry Laudan’s article Deadly Dilemmas.6  They explain that 
“[w]hile the prospect of convicting or executing a truly innocent person is horrifying, this type of 
mistake occurs within a highly complicated matrix of relationships where other equally 
horrifying mistakes go unnoticed in the conventional discourse.”7  Allen and Laudan recognize 
that some public policy reform measures that reduce the risk of convicting an innocent person 
may simultaneously increase the risk that a guilty criminal will escape conviction and go on to 
                                                 
2  Like other authors in this book, I focus on so-called “wrong man” cases – i.e., cases of the “factually innocent” or 
“actually innocent” persons being wrongfully convicted.  See Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the “Innocent:” An 
Examination of Alleged Cases of Wrongful Conviction from False Confessions, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 523, 
535 (1999).  See also Michael L. Radelet, How DNA Has Changed Contemporary Death Penalty Debates, infra 
(discussing conceptual issues surrounding innocence); Josh Marquis, The Myth of Innocence, 95 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 500, 508-09 (2005); Keith A. Findley, Defining Innocence, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1157 (2010).     
3  See Paul G. Cassell, Freeing the Guilty Without Protecting the Innocent: Some Skeptical Observations on 
Proposed New “Innocence” Procedures, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 1063 (2011).   
4  See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, In Defense of Victim Impact Statements, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 611, 629-30 (2009) 
(collecting citations to examples of victim impact statements).   
5  Marquis, supra note 2, at 517-18.   
6  Ronald J. Allen & Larry Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, 41 TEXAS TECH. L. REV. 65 (2008).  See also Larry Laudan & 
Ronald J. Allen, Deadly Dilemmas II: Bail and Crime, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 23 (2010); Ronald J. Allen & Larry 
Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas III: Some Kind Words for Preventive Detention, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 781 
(2011).   
7  Allen & Laudan, Deadly Dilemmas, supra note 6, at 68.   
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commit additional violent crimes.   
I will join Allen and Laudan in focusing on this possible tradeoff—specifically, the risk 
that putting in place measures to protect against convicting innocent persons will allow guilty 
criminals to escape conviction.  And I will likewise join them in narrowing the focus to a 
particular risk when the guilty are not convicted—specifically, the risk that an unconvicted 
criminal will go on to commit additional violent crimes (conventionally defined in the FBI’s 
annual crime reports as murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault).  Allen and Laudan have 
even attempted a tentative quantification of the precise tradeoff that exists in the current structure 
of our criminal justice system.  Rather than try to reinvent the wheel here on quantitative 
assessments of the tradeoff, I want to simply take the Allen and Laudan calculation as accurate.   
In a separate article, I explore their numbers at greater length.8   
Allen and Laudan concretely calculated comparative risks of a person being wrongfully 
convicted of a violent crime and being the victim of a serious crime.  They derive an estimated 
lifetime risk of being wrongfully convicted for a serious crime9 of about 0.06% (6 out of 
10,000).  They then compare this figure to the lifetime risk of a person being the victim of a 
violent crime – a risk of about 83% (or, for comparison, 8300 out of 10,000).  Based on these 
figures, Allen and Laudan conclude that “we can say with considerable confidence that the 
[lifetime] risk of being the victim of a serious crime in the United States is significantly more 
than 300 times greater than the lifetime risk of being falsely convicted of a serious crime.”10 
 
How to Think About Tradeoffs 
 
 What, then, to make of these estimated, and obviously very tentative, risk ratios?  Of 
course, one possible response is to attack the figures that Allen and Laudan derive.  Professor D. 
Michael Risinger, for example, has written a lengthy and interesting critique of the Allen and 
Laudan calculation11—a critique that I discuss at greater length elsewhere.12  The Allen and 
                                                 
8   See Paul G. Cassell, Comparing the Risk of Wrongful Conviction for a Violent Crime with the Risk of Being the 
Victim of a Violent Crime (manuscript on file with author).   
9 Their calculation refers to rape specifically, but it appears to be generalizable to other serious crimes as well.  See 
id. at 80 n. 81.   
10  Id.at 79-80.   
11 D. Michael Risinger, Essay: Tragic Consequences of Deadly Dilemmas: A Response to Allen and Laudan, 40 
SETON HALL L. REV. 991 (2010).   
12  See Cassell, supra note 8. 
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Laudan risk ratio does not rest on definitive numbers.  Instead, as Professor Marvin Zalman has 
helpfully suggested, these kinds of calculations are estimates—perhaps akin to a National 
Intelligence Estimate that is provided in a national security context.13 But even assuming that the 
criminal justice system suffers a much higher rate of erroneous conviction than Allen and 
Laudan suggest, it is clear that the average person stands a vastly higher chance—by many 
multiples—of being a victim of violence than a casualty of a wrongful conviction.   What I want 
to do here is assume that their calculation is roughly correct and tease out the implications.  
 Based on their risk ratio, Allen and Laudan contend that “insisting that we spare no 
efforts to reduce the risk of false conviction—even if the necessary measures significantly 
increase the risk of being a crime victim—is irrational.”14  In response, Risinger contends that 
the risk ratio of being a violent crime victim to being wrongfully convicted of a violent crime 
“does not make much difference” because “some such substantially higher risk must always 
attach to the risk of being a victim over the risk of being a convicted innocent simply as an 
inevitability of any likely set of social arrangements in the real world.”15   
If I am reading Risinger correctly, I disagree with his position. The ratio victims to 
wrongfully conviction will always be (and should always be) greater than one.  But surely it 
makes some difference in assessing proposed reform measures whether the ratio is in the 
neighborhood of, let’s say, 2:1 or 300:1 (as Allen and Laudan suggested) or even more.  Where 
the debate in this country is over what set of “social arrangements”—i.e., what sorts of 
innocence-protecting procedures ought to be place in criminal justice system—the size of these 
potential tradeoffs matter.  Indeed, Risinger himself does not appear to hold rigidly to his 
position.  In the penultimate sentence of his article, he makes a strong plea for adopting reforms 
that “help significant numbers of innocent convicted innocents without seriously impacting the 
rate of true convictions.”16  Of course, making assessments about what are “significant” numbers 
of innocent persons and whether an impact on the true conviction rate is “serious” requires some 
consideration of the magnitude of the numbers involved. 
 Risinger stands on much stronger ground in explaining that reform measures for 
addressing wrongful convictions can be divided into two categories with different moral 
                                                 
13 Marvin Zalman, Qualitatively Estimating the Incidence of Wrongful Convictions, 48 CRIM. L. BULL. 226, 231 
(2012).   
14 Allen & Laudan, supra note 6, at 80. 
15 Risinger, supra note 11, at 1016-17.   
16  Id. at 1019. 
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implications: Some reforms improve the diagnosticity of the system and thereby reduce the 
incidence of both wrongful convictions and wrongful acquittals or constitute reforms that protect 
the innocent with no reduction in convictions of the guilty—reforms that should be relatively 
uncontroversial.  Other reforms, however, increase the protections for the innocent at the expense 
of freeing more guilty persons—reforms that are more controversial precisely because of the 
tradeoff involved.17     
 The possibility that the most significant reforms will produce significant tradeoffs cannot 
be overlooked.  One concrete illustration (provided by Allen and Laudan) is reforms regarding 
eyewitness identification.  This appears to be one the most common causes of wrongful 
convictions.18  And yet many of the reform measures to address the problem appear to carry with 
them not only the prospect of avoiding misidentifications but also the possibility of discouraging 
accurate identifications.19  More broadly, as Professor Chris Slobogin has noted, “[m]ost 
reformist energy has understandably been focused on reducing wrongful convictions, through 
improved interrogation techniques, and identification procedures, defense involvement in the 
investigative process, and the like.  Most of these reforms, however, could also increase 
wrongful acquittals . . . .”20 
 Fully assessing the tradeoffs involved between what might be called rightful convictions 
and wrongful acquittals is an issue that dates back at least to Blackstone’s suggestion that it is 
“[b]etter that ten guilty persons escape than that one innocent suffer.”21  A strong argument can 
be made (and has been made by Risinger, among others in that long tradition) that the State bears 
                                                 
17  Id. at 1001.   
18  The National Registry of Exonerations listed “mistaken witness ID” as the third leading cause of wrongful 
convictions, trailing only perjury/false accusation and official misconduct.  National Registry of Exonerations, % 
Exonerations by Contributing Factor, available at 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/ExonerationsContribFactorsByCrime.aspx#.   
19  See Steven E. Clark, Blackstone and the Balance of Eyewitness Identification Evidence, 74 ALBANY L. REV. 101 
(2011); see also Laurie N. Feldman, The Unreliable Case Against the Reliability of Eyewitness Identifications: A 
Response to Judge Alex Kozinski, __ QUINNIPIAC L. REV. __ (forthcoming), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2684478.  For a helpful summary of the reform possibilities in 
this area, see BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTION THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 
248-52 (2011).   
20 Chris Slobogin, Lessons from Inquisitorialism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 699, 704 (2014); see also D. Michael Risinger 
& Lesley C. Risinger, Innocence Is Different: Taking Innocence into Account in Reforming Criminal Procedure, 56 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 869, 898 (2012) (problems with eyewitness misidentification are hard to be address because 
they are “inherent in the phenomenon”).  
21  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358; see also Alexander Volokh, N Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 
173 (1997).  For a recent and comprehensive effort to lay out a theoretical framework for evaluating such tradeoffs, 
see Daniel Epps, The Consequence of Error in Criminal Justice, 128 HARV. L.  REV. 1065 (2015).   
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a “special responsibility to insure that innocents that it sweeps up in carrying out its crime-
control functions are not convicted”—a responsibility that exceeds its obligations to prevent 
crime that is the “free-will-based choice” of a criminal.22   
And it also seems likely that the societal costs of a single wrongful felony conviction are 
higher than the societal costs of a single violent crime (setting aside the special case of 
homicide). One way to quantify this point would be compare jury verdicts (or civil settlements) 
in cases of wrongful conviction with jury verdicts in cases of criminal assaults.  A recent study, 
for example estimated the total tangible plus intangible pre-offense cost for different crimes (in 
2008 dollars).  The study concluded that the loss per crime victimization can be quantified as 
$8,982,907 for a murder, $240,776 for a rape/sexual assault, $107,020 for an aggravated assault, 
and $42,310 for a robbery.23  Comparable data could be collected for wrongful conviction cases, 
where substantial civil judgments (some of them larger than the numbers just cited24) have been 
entered in favor of those wrongfully convicted.  A further quantitative refinement of the tradeoffs 
discussed above would then be possible.25   
But adding to the complexities, there is a good possibility that releasing a guilty criminal 
produces not a single violent crime, but rather multiple crimes.  Criminals have high rates of 
recidivism and, if not incarcerated, may commit dozens of crimes before caught.26  Laudan, for 
example, has estimated that “every false acquittal enables more than thirty-six crimes (including 
on average seven violent ones) during the time when, but for the false acquittal, the defendant 
would have been incapacitated.”27   
                                                 
22  Risinger, supra note 11, at 1020.  See also Allen & Laudan, supra note 6, at 81-84 (discussing arguments by 
Ronald Dworkin and Immanuel Kant); Epps, supra note 21, at 1133-35.   
23 Kathryn E. McCollister et al., The Cost of Crime to Society: New Crime-Specific Estimates for Policy and 
Program Evaluation, 108 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 98, 105 tbl. 5 (2010); see also Ted R. Miller, Marc A. 
Cohen & Brian Wiersema, Nat’l Inst. of Justice, VICTIM COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: A NEW LOOK 9 tbl. 2 (1996) 
(using older data to conclude that loss per crime victimization can be quantified as $2,940,000 for a murder, $87,000 
for a sexual assault, and $19,000 for a robbery with injury).  Cf. David A. Anderson, The Cost of Crime, 7 
FOUNDATIONS & TRENDS IN MICROECONOMICS 209 (2012) (estimating total cost of crime in the U.S. at $3.2 trillion, 
more than total health care costs).  Similar figures from those quoted in the text come from the RAND Center on 
Quality Policing, which calculates a cost per murder of $8,649,216, per rape of $217,866, per aggravated assault of 
$87,238, and per robbery of $67,277.  Paul Heaton, Hidden in Plain Sight: What Cost-of-Crime Research Can Tell 
Us About Investing in Police, available at 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP279.pdf (2010).  
24  See, e.g., Limone et al. v, United States, No. 02-cv-10890-NG (D. Mass. 2007) ($101.7 million judgment).   
25  Cf. Paul G. Cassell, Too Severe?: A Defense of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines (and a Critique of the Federal 
Mandatory Minimums), 56 STAN. L. REV. 1017, 1037-41 (2004) (discussing cost-benefit analysis in federal 
sentencing based on victimization figures).   
26  See JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 145-58 (1983).   




One other qualitative factor might also need to be entered into the calculation: The 
general moral culpability of those who have been wrongfully convicted versus those who have 
been victims of crime.  The reader of this book, after seeing numerous accounts of wrongful 
convictions, may wonder what he or she can do to avoid such a fate.  While the other Chapters in 
this book do not discuss the answer to this question in detail, it seems likely that the best single 
answer is a simple one: Don’t commit a serious crime, particularly a crime of violence.  While 
the innocence literature does not highlight the fact, it appears that many of those wrongfully 
convicted were convicted because they had committed other crimes—either at the time of the 
crime for which they were wrongfully convicted or earlier.  For example, prior arrests can 
produce police photographs that can end up in a photospread to be misidentified.  Or prior crimes 
may arouse the suspicion of police detectives.   
One prominent illustration of how the wrongfully convicted may have some moral 
culpability is Anthony Porter, who was convicted of committing a drug-related homicide.  But it 
was apparently difficult for him to present a defense to that charge, because he may have been 
committing an armed robbery in the same park at the same time.  He ran from the park, gun in 
hand, in full view of witnesses.  Porter then denied not only the murder, but also being in the 
park—a lie he maintained until after his convictions were affirmed.28  
 The prevalence of criminal activity by those wrongfully convicted is suggested by a case 
I recently worked on involving an alleged wrongful conviction of Robert Wilcoxson.29  The 
North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission found Wilcoxson to be innocent of a drug-related 
murder.  But it appears that one reason he fell under suspicion is that (by his own admission) at 
the time of the murder he was an armed cocaine dealer making tens of thousands of dollars from 
                                                                                                                                                             
Doubt Doing More Harm than Good?, in 1 OXFORD STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195, 202 (Leslie Green & 
Brian Leiter eds., 2011).  But cf. Epps, supra note 21, at 1090-91 (critiquing this estimate).   
28  See Marquis, supra note 2, at 517.  Whether Porter was in fact innocent has been called into doubt by a new 
documentary movie, A Murder in the Park.  The documentary investigates the fact that Porter was released after a 
Medill Innocence Project investigation obtained a confession from Alstory Simon to the murder—a confession that 
led to Porter’s exoneration and Simon’s incarceration. But later Simon’s murder conviction was overturned, in part 
because of the Innocence Project’s coercive investigative tactics had tainted the case against Simon.  See Jim Stingl, 
Duped by Medill Innocence Project, Milwaukee Man Now Free, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL-SENTINEL, available at 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/duped-by-innocence-project-milwaukee-man-now-free-b99386015z1-
281852841.html. 
29  Disclosure: I served as an expert witness for law enforcement officers involved in the civil litigation that resulted 
from this case.   
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his crimes.30  Four other adults also fell under suspicion and were also convicted, wrongfully 
they have argued.  Still, it appears that they may have all have been involved in doing a series of 
armed robberies at around the same time.31  Thus, in this one case, possibly involving multiple 
wrongful convictions, it appears that all five of the allegedly wrongfully convicted participants 
were involved in other dangerous crimes apart from the murder for which they were convicted, 
which made it harder for them to convince authorities of their innocence. 
 The point here is not to blame those wrongfully convicted for their plight.  The more 
limited point is that, when assessing the priority to be given to competing claims between those 
wrongfully convicted and those who are past (or prospective) crime victims, in the aggregate the 
victims may have a far stronger claim.  Some support for this position comes from a study 
reporting that, for homicide and assault cases, the majority of the victims had no prior arrest 
record, while the majority of the offenders did.32   
A related point can be made about the wrongfully convicted who have pled guilty.  
Unless the defendant has entered an Alford plea (refusing to plead guilty but preserving his 
position of innocence), he has almost certainly committed perjury before the Court in entering 
his plea.  Consider, for example, Robert Wilcoxson and Kenneth Kagonyera.33  At their guilty 
plea hearings, both swore under oath that they were guilty, that they were satisfied with defense 
counsel, and that the other requisites for a knowing and voluntary guilty plea existed.  So far as 
the court records reveal, they also made no effort to enter an Alford plea. In addition, following 
Kagonyera’s decision to plead guilty, he met with the prosecutor and, in the presence of defense 
counsel made a very detailed statement about his involvement in the murder, implicating five 
other people.34  Kagonyera made these statements at his own initiative in an effort to convince 
the District Attorney that he could provide useful information by testifying against his co-
defendants.35   
                                                 
30 Deposition of Robert Wilcoxson, Wilcoxson v. Buncombe County et al., No. 1:13-cv-00224-MR-DLH (W.D>N.C. 
2014).   
31  Testimony of Damian Mills to North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, Dec. 18, 2013, at 481-82 (saying 
that he had been doing a series of breaking-and-enterings with Kagonyera, Williams, Isbell, and Brewton).   
32 See Arnite A. Varnedo, Characteristics of Offenders Arrested for Aggravated Assault, A Thesis Submitted to 
Dep’t of Criminal Justice Administration, Atlanta Univ., at 8-9 (May 1987). 
33 See North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission, State v. Kagonyera/Wilcoxson, available at 
http://www.innocencecommission-nc.gov/kagonyera.html.  
34  Memo. from Investigator Raymond to D.A. Moore regarding statement of Kenneth Kagonyera (Nov. 30, 2001) 
(memorializing statements made on Nov. 29, 2001).   
35  Kagonyera Dep. (1/9/15) at 134-35 (admitting this fact).   
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To be clear, if Kagonyera and Wilcoxson were in fact innocent,36 their guilty pleas were 
plainly wrongful convictions.  And no doubt, their pleas resulted from a plea bargaining process 
that can be coercive and place considerable pressure on even innocent persons to plead guilty—
making the choice of an innocent person to plead guilty in some sense rational.37  But 
particularly where defendants (like Kagonyera and Wilcoxson) have made no effort to enter 
Alford pleas,38 a decision to mislead the Court and enter a guilty plea produces a wrongful 
conviction that is, at least to some extent, the result of illegal choices on their part and 
presumably entitled to somewhat less weight in social harm calculus.39 
I would like to see more discussion of and data on these questions, and particularly the 
extent to which those wrongfully convicted had prior criminal records or were participating in 
crimes at the time of the offense for which they were wrongfully convicted.  (Similar data on 
victims would be interesting too.)  But the critical point here is that unraveling such competing 
claims to priority in reform promises to be very difficult.   
In this short Chapter, rather than embark on what would be a complicated effort to 
precisely quantify tradeoffs for particular reforms, I would like to search for reforms that help 
protect the innocent without freeing the guilty40—reforms that ought to be relatively 
uncontroversial, at least for those (including many of the authors in this book) who prioritize 
innocence issues over other values in the criminal justice system.41  I agree with those who argue 
that the risk our criminal justice system poses to the innocent is not trivial.42  But as the above 
quantification suggests, neither is the risk to crime victims, who bear the brunt of any failures of 
the system to apprehend or prosecute dangerous criminals.  It is against that backdrop that I turn 
to possible reforms that try to carefully attend to both sides of the equation. 43  
                                                 
36  The North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission has found both men to be factually innocent.    
37  Compare Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117 (2008) with Stephanos Bibas, 
Exacerbating Injustice, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 53, 54 (2008) (responding to Bowers’ article) 
38  Currently about 47 states, the District of Columbia, and the federal system allow Alford pleas.  See Stephanos 
Bibas, Harmonizing Substantive-Criminal-Law Values and Criminal Procedure: The Case of Alford and Nolo 
Contendere Pleas, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1351, 1372-73 n.52 (2003).   
39  It is also possible that they choose to plead guilty to the murder because they were guilty of other serious, violent 
crimes.  See supra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.   
40 I also search for reforms that do not reduce punishment for the guilty.  Cf. Erik Luna & Paul G. Cassell, 
Mandatory Minimalism, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (2010) (arguing for reduction in mandatory minimum sentences, a 
reform that might not only shorten sentences for the guilty but also reduce pressure on innocent defendants to plead). 
41 See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, Innocentrism, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1549. See generally DANIEL S. MEDWED, 
PROSECUTION COMPLEX: AMERICA’S RACE TO CONVICT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INNOCENT (2012). 
42  Risinger, supra note 11, at 999. 




II.   Protecting the Innocent While Simultaneously Convicting the Guilty 
 
 
 In light of the risk of potential tradeoffs between convicting the guilty while protecting 
the innocent, the reforms that are most likely to be justified on cost-benefit analysis will be those 
that do not present any significant risk of increasing crime victimization rates.  I have previously 
offered some thoughts on how this might be done.44  This short section highlights a few 
promising possibilities.   
 
More Research on the Frequency and Causes of Wrongful Convictions 
 
 At the top of my list of measures to address the problem of wrongful convictions of the 
innocent is further research on the extent and causes of the problem.45  In the previous section, I 
noted the Allen and Laudan calculations, which rested on very thin data.46   For public policy 
purposes, we need more information—information about, for example, wrongful convictions 
through guilty pleas (a key part of the Allen and Laudan estimate) and solid information about 
the incidence of wrongful convictions outside the areas of homicide and rape. 
The additional research needs to focus on the frequency of false confessions.  Professor 
Samuel Gross has aptly observed that “[t]he most important question about false convictions is 
also the most basic: How frequently are innocent people convicted of crimes?”47   To be sure, on 
the twenty-fifth anniversary of the first DNA exonerations, we now have far more information 
about wrongful convictions than in the past. But even disregarding the questions about how 
“innocence” is determined in some of this research,48 a more fundamental problem is the fact 
                                                                                                                                                             
Crime Control and Due Process, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 133, 134 (2008) (arguing that the goals of convicting the 
guilty and protecting the innocent are not mutually exclusive). 
44 See generally Cassell, supra note 3.   
45 Others have made similar pleas. See Morris B. Hoffman, The Myth of Factual Innocence, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
663, 689 (2007); see also Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano,  Sustainability of Innocence Reform, 77 ALB. L. REV. 
955, 983-993 (2014) (outlining research agenda for innocence issues). 
46 See Samuel R. Gross et al., Rate of False Conviction of Criminal Defendants Who Are Sentenced to Death, 111 
PNAS 7231 (May 20, 2014) (noting Risinger study, relied upon by Allen and Laudan for error rate, ultimately is 
based on only 11 cases of wrongful conviction).   
47  Samuel Gross, Convicting the Innocent, 4 ANN. REV. L. SOC. SCI. 173, 176 (2008). 
48 Compare Hugo Adam Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40 
STAN. L. REV. 21, 72–75 (1987) (presenting cases of alleged execution of the innocent), with Stephen J. Markman & 
Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent: A Response to the Bedau-Radelet Study, 41 STAN. L. REV. 121 (1988) 
(questioning the accuracy of the determinations of “innocence”); compare also Richard A. Leo & Richard J. Ofshe, 
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that a collection of alleged miscarriages based on DNA or any other factor may not be 
representative of the processing of cases in the American criminal justice system.49 
 To avoid this problem, researchers could take a random sample of a large number of 
felony criminal violent crime cases (1,000 seems like a good number) and then track them 
through the system to see what happens.50  While it might not be possible to follow all 1,000 
cases carefully, it would seem likely that the cases where a defendant might plausibly be 
innocent would shrink the numbers down fairly rapidly. Researchers could focus on this subset 
of cases and try to come up with an initial, plausible number of cases in which a wrongful 
conviction was even a possibility, and then perhaps press even further to try and get to the 
bedrock truth in this subset of cases.  This methodology has already been employed in other 
countries in the false confessions area.51 It should be tried on the broader subject of wrongful 
convictions.  Research of this type might be very valuable for revealing both the scope of the 
wrongful conviction problem and particular areas where wrongful convictions are prevalent. This 
would permit a targeted response to the problem, perhaps more narrowly addressing the risk to 
the innocent without freeing the guilty.52  
 
Refocus Post-Conviction Relief on Claims of Factual Innocence 
 
 One of the great problems for the innocence movement is trying to find the needles in a 
large haystack—that is, trying to identify innocent persons in a criminal justice system that 
processes mostly guilty defendants. Some commentators have made a frontal assault on this 
                                                                                                                                                             
The Consequences of False Confessions: Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of 
Psychological Interrogation, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998) (presenting cases of alleged wrongful 
convictions from false confessions), with Paul G. Cassell, The Guilty and the “Innocent”: An Examination of 
Alleged Cases of Wrongful Convictions from False Confessions, 1999 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 523 (1999) 
(questioning the accuracy of the determinations of “innocence”). 
49 See George C. Thomas III, Prosecutors: The Thin Last Line Protecting the Innocent, infra; Samuel R. Gross & 
Barbara O’Brien, Frequency and Predictors of False Conviction: Why We Know So Little, and New Data on Capital 
Cases, 5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 927 (2008). 
50 Others have proposed creating a commission to study cases of proven wrongful convictions. See, e.g., Keith A. 
Findley, Learning from Our Mistakes: A Criminal Justice Commission to Study Wrongful Convictions, 38 CAL. W. 
L. REV. 333 (2002). My proposal is slightly different because I propose to conduct research to expand our 
knowledge about a random sample of wrongful convictions, rather than simply study the nonrandom sample of 
wrongful convictions that have already come to light. 
51 See, e.g., Gisli H. Gudjonsson & Jon F. Sigurdsson, How Frequently Do False Confessions Occur?: An Empirical 
Study Among Prison Inmates, 1 PSYCHOL. CRIM & L. 21, 25 (1994).   
52 For example, I have previously proposed that we should pay particular attention to issues involving alleged false 
confessions by the mentally retarded, rather than overgeneralizing the problem and proceeding on the assumption 
that false confessions are a routine product of police interrogation of those with normal mental faculties. See Cassell, 
supra note 2, at 580–87. 
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problem by proposing that we limit access to some forms of judicial review to those who are 
making claims of actual innocence. For example, two distinguished legal scholars—Joseph 
Hoffmann and Nancy King—proposed that federal habeas corpus review of noncapital state 
court convictions and sentences should, with narrow exceptions, be abolished except for those 
who couple a constitutional claim with “clear and convincing proof of actual innocence.”53 
Relying on a comprehensive study of federal habeas corpus filings,54 they found that only seven 
of the 2,384 noncapital habeas filings in the study (0.29%) resulted in a grant of habeas relief, 
and one of those seven was later reversed on appeal.55 Hoffmann and King argued that habeas 
review of such claims “currently squanders resources while failing to remedy defense-attorney 
deficiencies. Those resources should be redeployed where they have a more meaningful chance 
of preventing the deficiencies in the first place.”56 They propose moving resources to indigent 
defense representation instead of largely pointless habeas litigation. 
 Hoffmann and King’s proposal is similar to others that have tried to focus habeas corpus 
on protecting the innocent. Most famously, Judge Henry Friendly argued that federal habeas 
relief for most constitutional errors should be conditioned on a showing of innocence.57 
Interestingly, he also proposed that a sufficient demonstration of innocence should itself be a 
basis for habeas relief,58 an issue that has bedeviled the Supreme Court in recent years.59 
Similarly, Professors John Jeffries, Jr. and William Stuntz have suggested allowing defaulted 
federal claims to be raised in federal habeas where those claims raise a reasonable probability 
that the defaulted claims resulted in an erroneous conviction.60  Professor Samuel Gross has 
                                                 
53 Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
791, 820 (2009). 
54 NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS (2007), 
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf. 
55 Id. at 52, 58, 115–16. 
56 Hoffman & King, supra note 53, at 823. 
57 See Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI L. REV. 143 
(1970). 
58 Id. at 167. 
59 See Joshua M. Lott, The End of Innocence? Federal Habeas Corpus Law After In re Davis, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 
443 (2011). The Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he existence merely of newly discovered evidence relevant to the 
guilt of a state prisoner is not a ground for relief on federal habeas corpus.” Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 398 
(1993) (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 317 (1963)). Nonetheless, there has been enough uncertainty about 
that statement that more than one hundred freestanding innocence claims have since been filed in federal habeas 
courts. See Nicholas Berg, Turning a Blind Eye to Innocence: The Legacy of Herrera v. Collins, 42 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 121, 131 (2005). 
60 John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default in Federal Habeas 
Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679 (1990). 
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argued for giving defendant claiming innocence the option for an “investigative trial,” in which 
the defendant would be able to argue his innocence, provided he waived important rights—in 
exchange, the defendant (if convicted) would be given greater freedom to raise post-conviction 
claims of innocence. 61  And most recently, in this book, Professor Stephanie Hartung has argued 
for a post-conviction “innocence track” in federal habeas, under which any prisoner who 
establishes innocence by a preponderance of the evidence would be entitled to a blanket 
exemption from procedural bars.62  
 One of the interesting things about post-conviction review is that, by definition, it cannot 
interfere with the process of convicting the guilty at trial. Accordingly, post-conviction review 
offers a particularly promising approach for escaping the tradeoffs highlighted earlier.63  
 One proposal worth serious exploration combines aspects of the Hoffmann and King 
proposal, along with Judge Friendly’s insight that federal habeas should focus on innocence and 
Professor Hartung’s idea for an innocence track.  We could restrict federal habeas to those who 
have a colorable claim of factual innocence.  Those prisoners could then be required to establish 
factual innocence by a preponderance of the evidence and, if they did so, they would have a 
blanket exemption from any procedural bars to raising claims for relief in federal court.64  I 
would also add to Hartung’s innocence track the idea that if a prisoner who had proven he was 
innocent did not receive federal habeas relief, the federal courts could at least remand the case 
back to the prisoner’s State Supreme Court for further inquiry as to whether state relief might be 
available. 
 Professor Hartung (and others) may wonder about why the innocence track needs to be 
coupled with the abolition of federal habeas for those who are raising claims unrelated to 
innocence.  The answer is straightforward: time, energy, and resources are limited.  Given 
Hoffmann and King’s finding that federal habeas relief for procedural violations is essentially an 
impossibility, it make no sense to allow those claims to continue to be pressed before federal 
courts.  Restructuring federal habeas so that it only concerns prisoners alleging factual innocence 
would help federal courts re-conceptualize their mission to the benefit of wrongfully convicted 
                                                 
61 Samuel R. Gross, Pretrial Incentives, Post-Conviction Review, and Sorting Criminal Prosecutions by Guilt or 
Innocence, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1009 (2011). 
62 Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Post-Conviction Procedure: The Next Frontier in Innocence Reform, infra. 
63  A similar point can be made in support of Professor Warden’s proposal to give close attention to post-conviction 
recantation by trial witnesses.  See Rob Warden, Reacting to Recantations, infra. 
64 For an interesting effort along these lines in the area of direct appeals, see Helen A. Anderson, Revising Harmless 
Error: Making Innocence Relevant to Direct Appeals, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 391 (2011). 
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prisoners—precisely the sort of change that helps the innocent without freeing the guilty. It 
seems almost irrefutable that the innocent will benefit from a system concentrating on them—
that is, that we can find needles more effectively in smaller haystacks. 
 
Increasing Resources for Indigent Defense Counsel and Prosecutors to Focus on Issues Relating 
to Actual Innocence 
 
 On the issue of wrongful convictions, the elephant in the room is little discussed but 
obvious: money.  The root cause of wrongful convictions is almost certainly insufficient 
resources devoted to the criminal justice system. Whatever individual causes might be 
pinpointed in particular cases, more resources would often have enabled defense counsel (or 
police and prosecuting agencies) to locate persuasive evidence of innocence.65  If this diagnosis 
is correct, then an important part of the true solution to the wrongful conviction problem may be 
devoting additional resources to the criminal justice system.66 
 Given the fiscal realities of the world we live in, however, it may be an academic 
proposal to call for significant new funding for defense attorneys, for example.67 At a macro 
level, the funds devoted to the criminal justice system are probably roughly fixed and not much 
is likely to change in the near term.68 What is needed, then, is to prioritize innocence over other 
criminal justice expenditures. Fortunately, for those who truly believe in “innocentrism,” there 
are ways to do this—as I discuss in the next several sections.  
 
Abolishing the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, and Consequently Shifting Defense 
Resources Away from Litigating Purely Procedural Claims 
 
If we want the criminal justice system to prioritize the issue of innocence and devote 
more resources to it, then a good start would be to consider abolishing the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule. Abolition of the rule and replacing it with a system of civil damage remedies 
                                                 
65 See Robert Gehrke, If Utah Doesn’t Provide Better Legal Defense for the Poor, ACLU May File Lawsuit, SALT 
LAKE TRIB., Sept. 20, 2015, available at http://www.sltrib.com/news/2966774-155/if-utah-doesnt-provide-better-
legal (discussing case of wrongful conviction in Utah where overworked public defender was apparently unable to 
obtain alibi witnesses).   
66 See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Negotiating Accuracy: DNA in the Age of Plea Bargaining, infra. 
67 See Mary Sue Backus & Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, a National Crisis, 57 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1031, 1059 (2006); Paul Cassell & Nancy Gertner, Public Defenders Fall to the Sequester, WALL ST. J., Aug. 
20, 2013 (urging that federal public defender funds not be sequestered).   
68 See Erik Lillquist, Improving Accuracy in Criminal Cases, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 897 (2007) (noting a common 
assumption that there are fixed resources devoted to criminal justice). 
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has been advocated by such distinguished legal figures as Chief Justice Warren Burger,69 Dallin 
Oaks,70 Akhil Amar,71 Bill Pizzi,72 and Paul Robinson.73 The classic argument for abolishing the 
exclusionary rule is that the rule sets criminals free because the constable has blundered.74 But 
there is a more subtle, and in many ways more pernicious, defect to the exclusionary rule. Under 
a regime that allows the “deliberate exclusion of truth from the fact-finding process,”75 defense 
efforts will move toward issues involving the validity of evidence collection rather than toward 
assessing the quality of the evidence itself. Professor William Stuntz perhaps most famously 
made this point in his writings, explaining how a system with limited resources that emphasizes 
procedure over substance will give short shrift to factual claims of innocence.76 Stuntz is 
cautious in his argument. As he explains, the current system does not simply involve a direct 
tradeoff, but rather “places substantial pressure on [defense] counsel to opt for the procedural 
claim rather than the (potential) substantive one.”77 But Stuntz’s bottom-line conclusion seems 
unassailable: there is some tradeoff in the current regime favoring procedural claims over 
substantive ones.78 
In addition to these kinds of tradeoffs, the exclusionary rule creates a perverse screening 
at trial.79  Jurors deciding cases may believe that a weak prosecution case actually is the result of 
the exclusion of evidence.  Because of facts such as these, it seems difficult to contest that 
“actually guilty defendants are most likely to benefit from the exclusionary rule.”80   
                                                 
69 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 500–01 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
70 See Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 739–40 
(1970). 
71 See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 40–45 (1997). 
72 See WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH: WHY OUR SYSTEM OF CRIMINAL TRIALS HAS BECOME AN 
EXPENSIVE FAILURE AND WHAT WE NEED TO DO TO REBUILD IT (1999). 
73 PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY CRIMINAL LAW DOESN’T GIVE PEOPLE 
WHAT THEY DESERVE (2006). 
74 People v. Defore, 150 N.E. 585, 587(N.Y.1926).  
75 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
76 William Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 
37–40 (1997).     
77 Id. at 40. 
78 Professor Robert Mosteller responded to Stuntz’s argument by reporting his own experience that motions to 
suppress “posed only a minimal drain on defense resources.” Robert P. Mosteller, Protecting the Innocent: Part of 
the Solution for Inadequate Funding for Defenders, Not a Panacea for Targeting Justice, 75 MO. L. REV. 931, 955–
56 (2010). But Mosteller concedes that his experience comes from a system in which motions to suppress were set 
on the eve of trial, thereby preventing most such motions from being litigated. Id. at 956. Such a system seems 
atypical to me. For example, in both the state and federal systems in Utah, motions to suppress are typically litigated 
well in advance of trial and thus often produce contested suppression hearings. 
79 Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 633 (2015). 
80  Id. at 636. 
16 
 
 Given these tradeoffs, those with an innocentric view of the world should be the first to 
jump on the replace-the-exclusionary-rule-with-civil-damages bandwagon. Surely the experience 
of the rest of the world suggests that the exclusionary rule is not the only way to restrain police 
abuses.81 There is good reason to think that we can craft a damages regime for protecting Fourth 
Amendment rights that will fully preserve them, just as we rely on a damages regime to protect 
other civil liberties, such as our First Amendment rights.82 
Once procedural issues regarding the legality of searches are diverted to the civil justice 
system, the criminal justice system would gain substantial new resources to devote to innocence 
issues. While the percentage of cases in which the exclusionary rule results in guilty criminals 
going free is disputed,83 it does not appear to be disputed that the exclusionary rule results in 
“tens of thousands of contested suppression motions each year.”84 Instead of filing and litigating 
these motions that have nothing to do with innocence, defense counsel could turn their attention 
to substantive issues about who committed the crime. Prioritizing substantive issues of guilt and 
innocence over procedural issues of the reasonableness of searches is exactly the way the system 
should be structured—and a way the both increases the chance of convicting the guilty while 
reducing the chance of convicting the innocent. 
 
Replacing the Miranda Regime with the Videotaping of Custodial Interrogations 
 
  The problem of procedure over substance is not confined solely to Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence. The same flaw has developed in confession law. Here again, those who are most 
concerned about innocence should be skeptical of the law’s current structure, which relies largely 
                                                 
81 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 624 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that when adopted, the 
exclusionary rule was “unique to American jurisprudence” and that “a categorical exclusionary rule has been 
‘universally rejected’ by other countries”); see also William T. Pizzi, The Need to Overrule Mapp v. Ohio, 82 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 679, 717-29 (2011) (discussing limited use of exclusionary remedies in Canada, New Zealand, 
England and Ireland). 
82 See AKHIL AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 27–29 (1998) (explaining why the 
exclusionary rule is a bad way to deter police misconduct compared to a civil damages regime). Cf. Yale Kamisar, 
Mapp v. Ohio 50 Years Later, NAT’L L.J., June 13, 2011, at 50 (arguing that critics of the exclusionary rule may not 
really want an effective alternative remedy because it would be just as burdensome on law enforcement). 
83 Compare United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984) (arguing that the small percentage researchers deal with 
masks the large number of felons released from prison based in part on illegal searches and seizures), with id. at 950 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that only a very small percentage of all felony arrests are declined for prosecution 
on grounds of potential exclusionary rule problems). 
84 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 785 (2010) (quoting William Stuntz, The Virtues and Vices of the 
Exclusionary Rule, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 443, 444 (1997)). 
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on Miranda warnings and waivers to protect against coercive interrogations. As a practical 
matter, this approach does little to help the innocent and prioritizes litigation about Miranda 
compliance over litigation about the accuracy of confessions. The result has been a regime that is 
not particularly well-suited to address “false confession” issues85—i.e., is not well-suited to 
protecting the innocent.  Today Miranda “serves mainly to distract lawyers, scholars, and judges 
from considering the real problem of interrogation, which is how to convict the guilty while 
protecting the innocent.”86  
 The “central problem with Miranda is that it was not crafted specifically to prevent false 
confessions, but rather to regulate interrogations more generally.”87  The problem starts with the 
probability that innocent defendants are most likely to waive their Miranda protections. Innocent 
persons have nothing to hide from the police, and so they almost invariably waive their Miranda 
rights.88 Once they waive their rights, the Miranda procedures do little (if anything) to restrain 
police questioning techniques, a point that seems to be generally accepted.89 
 Miranda’s procedural requirements, like those of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule, also shift defense attorney time and attention away from claims of innocence. The Miranda 
procedures have spawned considerable litigation about whether a suspect was in “custody,” 
whether a suspect “waived” his rights, or whether a suspect “invoked” his right to counsel.90 
These issues generally have little to do with the reliability of any confession that police might 
obtain through questioning. Thus, like the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, these issues 
tend to draw defense attorney attention toward raising claims about process rather than about 
substance.91 
 
                                                 
85 See generally Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from Lost Confessions and False Confessions – And from 
Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497 (1998).  . 
86 Steven B. Duke, Does Miranda Protect the Innocent or the Guilty?, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 551, 566-67 (2007); see 
also Ronald J. Allen, Miranda’s Hollow  Core, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 71 (2006).    
87  Tonja Jacobi, Miranda 2.0, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2656405.    
88 See Cassell, supra note 85, at 539–40. 
89 Christopher Slobogin, Towards Taping, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 309 (2003) (arguing that Miranda has had an 
“immunizing” effect on deceptive interrogation tactics); OFFICE OF LEGAL POLICY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT 
TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE LAW OF PRETRIAL INTERROGATION 97–98 (1986), reprinted in 22 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 437 (1989). 
90 See 39 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PRO. 1, 179–99 (2014) (collecting approximately 400 recent federal court of 
appeals cases on Miranda issues). 
91 See Stuntz, supra note 76, at 44 (advancing the argument that Miranda doctrine causes shift of attention away 
from defendants with factual issues to raise and toward defendants with procedure claims to raise).  
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 Miranda has also turned the attention of trial judges away from questions of the 
reliability of confessions and toward questions about police compliance with the Miranda rules. 
As Professor Welsh White has observed, before Miranda, reliability “played an important role in 
our constitutional jurisprudence . . . . [Since Miranda], however, courts and legal commentators 
have largely ignored issues relating to untrustworthy confessions.”92 To be sure, as a matter of 
black letter law, the Miranda procedural requirements were piled on top of traditional 
voluntariness requirements. But as a practical matter, judicial attention is a scarce resource. 
Miranda has created a triumph of formalism.93 Prioritizing one set of claims (Miranda 
compliance) has inevitably reduced scrutiny of the others—to the disadvantage of innocent 
defendants.  As Professor Steven Duke has explained, not only is Miranda “virtually useless”, 
but it “replaced a vibrant and developing voluntariness inquiry that took into account the 
vulnerabilities of the particular suspect as well as the inducement and conditions of the 
interrogation.”94 The bottom line is that “not only has Miranda allowed the police to disregard 
actual voluntariness, it has enabled the courts to be equally unconcerned with actual 
innocence.”95 
 One last injury to the innocent defendants is worth noting. Good reasons exist for 
believing that Miranda has significantly hampered the ability of police officers to obtain 
confessions from guilty criminals.96 This has not only harmed law enforcement’s ability to 
convict guilty criminals but also the opportunity of innocent individuals to use those confessions 
to exonerate themselves.97 For example, Professor Gross has noted that the number of 
exonerations when the actual criminal confessed declined sometime between the mid-1950s and 
the early 1970s.98 Gross cites among the possible causes the Miranda decision, which “may 
                                                 
92 Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Unworthy Confessions, 17 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 156 (1997). 
93 JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH AND THE LAW 206–16 (1996). 
94 Duke, supra note 86, at 564.   
95 Jacobi, supra note87, at 12.   
96 See, e.g., Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 387 (1996); 
Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects 
on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1055 (1998); Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 
1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839 (1996). These conclusions are not 
universally accepted. Compare, John J. Donohue III, Did Miranda Diminish Police Effectiveness?, 50 STAN. L REV. 
1147 (1998) (critiquing the validity of the data used to correlate Miranda with diminished clearance), with Paul G. 
Cassell, Falling Clearance Rates After Miranda: Coincidence or Consequence?, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1181 (1998) 
(responding to these criticisms). 
97 See Cassell, supra note 85, at 550–52. 
98 Samuel R. Gross, Loss of Innocence: Eyewitness Identification and Proof of Guilt, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 395, 430–
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result in some reduction in the number of confessions.”99 Thus, by impairing the system’s ability 
to get to the truth in cases, Miranda has caused the innocent to suffer. 
 A system that respects the constitutional right against self-incrimination, while at the 
same time providing greater protection for innocent suspects, could be easily designed. There 
appears to be wide agreement that video recording interrogations would offer far greater 
protection for innocent suspects than does the current Miranda regime.100 I made a proposal long 
ago for substituting video recording of police questioning as a substitute for Miranda, based in 
part in the need to protect the innocence.101 Other commentators have proposed that recording 
should supplement Miranda.102 A fair number of jurisdictions are moving forward with requiring 
video recording of at least some interrogations,103 although recording is often left to the 
discretion of police officers or mandated only for very serious crimes.  The “Innocence 
Movement” could speed the adoption of this important reform if they would highlight the extent 
to which Miranda does not offer effective protection to the innocent and suggest that, instead, we 
should use video recording.   
 Moving in this direction has the great advantage of not interfering with the conviction of 
the guilty.  It appears that video recording does not greatly interfere with the ability of law 
enforcement to obtain confessions and, of course, if the Miranda rules were relaxed or replaced 
by video recording, there would be an unambiguous boost to prosecution efforts.  As a result, 
this kind of reform would not only avoid the tradeoffs discussed above, but would indeed be a 
true “win-win”: more convictions of the guilty, while fewer convictions of the innocent. 
  
Requiring All Defense Attorneys to Directly Ask Their Clients, “Did You Commit the Crime?” 
and Aggressively Investigate Claims of Actual Innocence 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
31 (1987). 
99 See Cassell, supra note 85,. at 51. For reasons to think that Miranda is the most likely cause of this drop in 
confessions, see Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs, supra note 96, at 285. 
100 See Yale Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case: Why We Needed It, How We Got It—and 
What Happened To It, 5 OHIO. ST. J. CRIM. L. 163, 189–90 (2007). 
101 See Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs, supra note 96, at 486–92. 
102 See, e.g., Lisa Lewis, Rethinking Miranda: Truth, Lies, and Videotape, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 199 (2007); Lisa C. 
Oliver, Mandatory Recording of Custodial Interrogations Nationwide: Recommending a New Model Code, 39 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 263 (2005). 
103 See Alan M. Gershel, A Review of the Law in Jurisdictions Requiring Electronic Recording of Custodial 
Interrogations, 16 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 9 (2010); Michael Schmidt, In Policy Change, Justice Dept. to Require 
Recording of Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2014.   
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 A critical resource in the efforts to prevent wrongful convictions is defense attorneys.  
Yet the great bulk of innocence literature seems to focus attention on prosecutors as the source of 
the problems.104  For example, in his Chapter in this book, Professor George Thomas calls 
prosecutors “the thin last line protecting the innocent.”105  And he is surely right that prosecutors 
have critical steps they can take to reduce wrongful convictions, such as by fully discharging 
their Brady obligations to produce exculpatory evidence (a point I have pressed elsewhere).106     
 But the Innocence Movement has largely overlooked what may be an even more 
important bulwark against false convictions: defense attorneys.  Unfortunately, the mindset of 
the defense bar toward the question of whether their clients are in fact guilty has been aptly 
described as one of “staggering indifference.”107 Indeed, it is sometimes even argued that it is 
inconsistent with ethical obligations for defense counsel to focus on innocence.108  Defense 
attorneys simply cannot consider whether their clients are guilty, it is argued, because doing so 
would impair the quality of the representation they provide.109  And, more broadly it is argued, 
focusing on innocence issues may distract society from dealing with mass incarceration and 
other issues associated with the guilty.110 
 I am unconvinced. Innocent persons ensnared in the criminal justice system have a 
stronger claim to our attention than do the guilty.  If we want to structure an “innocentric” 
criminal justice system that gives highest priority to preventing the conviction of the innocent,111 
defense attorneys must be involved. In fact, defense attorneys—who (unlike prosecutors) have 
constant and direct access to defendants—may be uniquely positioned to identify a miscarriage 
of justice before it happens and take steps to prevent it.  They are also well-poised to increase the 
“diagnosticity” of the system, by helping to flag the relatively small percentage of cases in the 
system genuinely involving factual innocence claims.112 
                                                 
104  See, e.g., Dana Carver Boehm, The New Prosecutor’s Dilemma: Prosecutorial Ethics and the Evaluation of 
Actual Innocence, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 613. 
105  George Thomas, Prosecutors: The Thin Last Line Protecting the Innocent, infra.  
106  See Cassell, supra note 3, at 1084-86. 
107  Barbara Allen Babcock, Defending the Guilty, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 180 (1983). 
108  Robert Mosteller, Why Defense Attorneys Cannot, But Do, Care About Innocence, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1 
(2010).   
109 See id.; see also Margaret Raymond, The Problem with Innocence, 49 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 449 (2001). 
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 Here is one example of how we might think about reorienting defense counsel toward 
innocence issues. Many defense attorneys do not directly ask their clients whether they are guilty 
of the crime charged.113 This ignorance may permit defense attorneys to perhaps raise defenses 
that might otherwise be barred by rules of legal ethics.114 But why should we give defense 
counsel such freedom if we are trying to structure a criminal justice system that focuses on 
innocence? It is hard to see what larger societal interest is served by allowing counsel to move 
forward in ignorance of this important fact. It may be true, as some defense advocates have 
argued, that a defense attorney can never be sure whether her client is telling the truth when a 
defendant claims to be innocent.115 But requiring defense attorneys to at least ask that basic 
question would serve the valuable function of putting this issue squarely out in the open, helping 
innocent defendants.  And the only “cost” is that defense counsel for some guilty defendants 
might be limited in the kinds of arguments that can be advanced at trial—a cost that society 
surely ought to be willing to bear to have a system that more accurately sorts the innocent from 
the guilty.    
 Simply requiring the defense attorney to ask this straightforward question probably 
would not make much of a change in the current system. Part of the current criminal justice game 
seems to be for defendants to deny their involvement in a crime—at least at the start of a case. 
For example, Professor Robert Mosteller reports that, when he was a defense attorney, virtually 
all of his clients claimed to be innocent until he recited the advantages of a specific plea offer; at 
that point, they conceded their guilt.116 In light of this fact, maybe defense attorneys should be 
required not only to ask their clients if they committed the crime but to also explore more 
thoroughly whether a defendant is truly guilty or innocent. This requirement could be enforced 
by a rule that only if a defendant admits he is guilty would a defense attorney be permitted to 
explore a standard plea bargain.117 Such a requirement might promote more frank and open 
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discussion between defense attorneys and their clients about whether they were involved in the 
crime. 
 Forcing defense attorneys to truly attempt to learn whether their clients are guilty or 
innocent would create a real advantage: it would give the criminal justice system one more 
opportunity to begin sorting innocent defendants from guilty ones through the one person who 
has the best access to important information—the defendant. Professor Mosteller may properly 
complain about how defense attorneys have difficulties obtaining access to witnesses and other 
forms of evidence,118 but the barriers to information are not all one-sided. Prosecutors are usually 
precluded from talking to defendants once legal counsel enters the scene. But defendants are 
obviously in a unique position to provide information that can sort the guilty from the innocent. 
If defendants can be induced to provide more thorough information to their attorneys about 
whether they are innocent or guilty, then the system can more effectively protect against 
wrongful conviction. 
 With the innocence issue directly on the table for discussion, how should defense counsel 
proceed when her client reports that he is innocent? Professor Mosteller rightly bristles at the 
suggestion that there should be some sort of “second-class treatment” of defendants who state 
clearly that they are guilty.119 He explains quite nicely that defense counsel have important 
duties to perform in the criminal justice system, even when performing the far more common 
duty of defending those who have in fact committed the crimes charged against them. But he 
interestingly goes on to discuss the idea that perhaps individual defense attorneys—or the 
criminal justice system more broadly—should try to devote additional resources to cases in 
which a defendant has a good claim of actual innocence.120 Of course, defense attorneys—and 
the system—are not well-positioned to do this if the defendant is not even asked whether he is in 
fact innocent.  
 
 If a defendant claims to be innocent, as a first step defense counsel obviously ought to 
adequately investigate the claim. Presumably adequate defense investigation happens in many 
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cases,121 regardless of whether a defendant claims to be innocent or guilty. But if some defense 
attorneys are not squarely raising the innocence issue because they think ignorance is tactically 
useful, they may end up missing a chance to discover exculpatory evidence that could set a 
defendant free.122 
 Following such an investigation, defense counsel should obviously rely on the procedures 
available in our criminal justice system for presenting a defense. Within our traditional structure, 
defense attorneys have many tools that they can employ in the defense of innocent clients. 
 But in reviewing cases of wrongful conviction over the years, one omission from the 
defense repertoire has always puzzled me. I have always wondered why, in a rare case where a 
defense attorney believes she is representing a truly innocent client, she almost invariably fails to 
bring the prosecutor into the discussion. The wrongful conviction literature suggests it is unusual 
for a defense attorney to communicate her specific concerns directly to a prosecutor.123 Perhaps 
this is part of a larger culture of distrust between prosecutors and defense attorneys that appears 
to afflict at least some jurisdictions.124 But direct communication on this issue needs to be 
strongly encouraged.125 
 It would, of course, be naive to think that defense counsel reports to prosecutors could 
prevent every wrongful conviction of an innocent defendant. But I am surprised to discover that 
defense counsel so rarely employ this approach. Perhaps an unfortunate reason is that defense 
attorneys behave in the way that Mosteller suggests: they simply do not view their job as having 
much to do with guilt or innocence.126 If defense attorneys proceed in this way, they never learn 
whether they have an innocent defendant for a client as opposed to a guilty one. This agnostic 
approach may help to avoid burnout on the job or allow for an increased feeling of self-worth, as 
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some have argued in justification.127 But this strikes me as a something of a cop-out, leading the 
Innocence Movement to point fingers first at errant prosecutors and rogue police officers while 
too often ignoring the role of ignorant defense attorneys. If we wish to leave no stone unturned in 
our efforts to prevent conviction of the innocent, it is time to broaden our perspective to include 




 Preventing wrongful conviction of the innocent is a fundamental priority of our criminal 
justice system. But it is obviously not the system’s only goal.  Efforts to prevent conviction of 
the innocent should avoid interfering with other objectives, most prominently the need to convict 
the guilty and prevent the suffering of future crime victims.  Comparing even rough estimates of 
the risk of a person being wrongfully sent to prison for committing a violent crime with the risk 
of becoming a violent crime victim suggests that the current tradeoffs between the two may 
incline dramatically toward increasing victimization.   
 But there are some kinds of reforms that can avoid debate about these tradeoffs – true 
“win-win” measures that simultaneously reduce the number of innocents wrongfully convicted 
while increasing (or least not decreasing) the number of violent criminals sent to prison.  This 
Chapter lays out a few such possibilities, including confining habeas relief to those with claims 
of factual innocence, replacing the exclusionary rule with a civil damage remedy, moving 
confession law away from technical Miranda procedures, and requiring defense attorneys to 
explore their clients’ guilt or innocence.  If we are truly committed to protecting the innocent, we 
can and should take such specific steps.  We can reduce the risk of wrongfully convicting the 
innocent without setting free the guilty.   
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